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Abstract—A digital forensics process aims to collect and ana-
lyze the evidence essential to demonstrate a potential hypothesis of
a crime. We propose the use of forensic requirements to automate
a digital forensics process. We augment traditional reactive digital
forensics processes - used to perform an investigation - with
proactive evidence collection and analysis activities, which pro-
vide immediate investigative suggestions before an investigation
starts. These activities dynamically adapt depending on suspicious
events, which in turn might require the collection and analysis of
additional evidence. The reactive activities of a traditional digital
forensics process are also adapted depending on the current
investigation findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital forensics [1] aims to collect and analyze necessary
digital evidence to demonstrate how a computer crime was
committed, what harm was done, and who was responsible.
A digital forensics investigation thus collects and analyzes
the evidence essential to demonstrate a potential hypothesis
of crime. It also includes a presentation activity to illustrate
the investigation findings (proved/refuted hypothesis). While
several research and commercial tools, such as EnCase [2],
are available to automate evidence collection, investigations
are still highly human-intensive. Investigators usually approach
each crime case from scratch, by postulating potential hypothe-
ses. Existing tools do not provide any investigative direction
to suggest what are the possible hypotheses, including the
evidence they require to be demonstrated, and their likelihood
of being true. Since the findings of a digital investigation
should be based on objective evidence, a digital forensics
process should use well founded and systematic techniques
to help investigators assess the likelihood of each hypothesis
and provide sound evidence in court.
To address these shortcomings, we augment digital foren-
sics processes with proactive analysis and collection activities.
These activities preserve and analyze important evidence be-
fore an investigation starts. The outcome of such activities is
then used to provide immediate suggestions regarding what
hypotheses should be investigated (because they are more
likely to be true) and what evidence should be collected to
completely prove/refute them. To preserve important evidence,
proactive analysis must identify suspicious events that require
to adapt the proactive collection activities in order to gather
additional evidence. The reactive activities of a traditional
digital forensics process may also adapt depending on the
current investigation findings.
This paper applies requirements engineering techniques to
configure the behavior of an adaptive digital forensics process.
We propose to model the forensics requirements to capture
the crime scene and the potential hypotheses of a crime. We
use structured arguments, forensics arguments, to represent
the hypotheses of crime. Each hypothesis is a claim that is
related to a set of facts necessary to prove or refute it. The
facts represent the evidence to be collected from the digital
devices (evidence sources) available at the crime scene. We
formally express forensics arguments in the Event Calculus [3]
and support the formal verification of hypotheses depending
on the percentage of facts that have been demonstrated (i.e.,
ampliative probability [4]). Forensics arguments are also used
to express conditions that may start/stop the full evidence
collection performed proactively. Thus, forensics requirements
are used to instrument the proactive and reactive activities of
a digital forensics process.
II. ADAPTIVE DIGITAL FORENSICS PROCESS
As shown in Figure 1, our approach comprises eight steps.
1) Requirements Modeling: a security administrator designs
the forensics requirements. These include a domain model
of a crime scene, which represents the assets that can be
harmed, the topology of the physical space where a crime
can be committed, the configuration of the digital devices
available, users roles and permissions. For example, the crime
scene may indicate that a valuable document (Doc) is stored
on a machine (M1) located in an office (T225), and only
authorized employees (Alice and Bob) can access this office,
by swiping their badge on a NFC reader (NFC). A CCTV
monitors the entrance and exit to/from T225. The security
administrator also designs the forensics arguments. These may
represent suspicious events conditions that must hold to start
and stop the full evidence collection performed proactively
(starts/stop arguments). These also represent the hypothesis of
the potential crimes that can be committed in the crime scene
(reactive arguments). These arguments are initially expressed
in a generic form and are subsequently customized depending
on the potential offenders and the devices modeled in the crime
scene. For example, the potential hypothesis of a crime can
state that at least one user is in T225, one of the employee
accesses the Doc in M1 while his/her USB pen is mounted. The
start and stop argument can respectively express the conditions
that signal that an employee is logged on M1 and accesses the
Doc and an employee is not logged anymore on M1.
2) Configuration: a Requirements Manager uses the foren-
sics requirements to configure the proactive and reactive activ-
ities of the digital forensics process. It uses the start and stop
arguments to configure the Proactive Analysis. It also leverages
the data necessary to check the start and stop arguments to
configure the Proactive Collection, such as accesses to T225
(from the log of the NFC), logins on M1 and accesses to Doc
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Fig. 1. Adaptive Digital Forensics Process.
(from the system and registry log of M1). The Requirements
Manager uses the reactive arguments to generate all possible
hypotheses of a crime, which are given in input to the Reactive
Analysis. In this case, 12 hypotheses must be checked. These
are obtained by customizing the reactive argument depending
on who can be in T225 (Alice only, Bob only, or Alice and
Bob together), who can log on M1 (Alice or Bob), and who
can own a USB pen that is mounted on M1 (Alice or Bob).
3) Proactive Collection: during the normal system func-
tioning, the Monitor collects the data identified during the
previous step, sends them to the Event Calculus Analyzer
(Analyzer) and stores them securely.
4) Proactive Analysis: every time new evidence is avail-
able, the Analyzer checks whether the conditions to start/stop
the full evidence collection are satisfied and sends the results to
the Requirements Manager. To perform this task the Analyzer
uses the deductive reasoning functionality of event calculus. In
case a start argument is satisfied for a set of specific elements
of the crime scene, the Requirements Manager reconfigures the
Proactive Analysis in order to check whether the corresponding
stop argument is satisfied for the same elements of the crime
scene. The Proactive Collection is reconfigured to gather all
possible evidence. For example, if Bob is logged on M1 and
accesses the Doc, the stop argument that should be checked by
the Proactive Analysis claims that Bob is not logged anymore
on M1. While the Proactive Collection gathers additional
events, such as when devices are mounted, unmounted, or
installed on M1. When the full evidence collection is switched
on and the stop argument is satisfied, the proactive collection
and analysis activities are (re-)configured as in step 2.
5) Investigation Set-up: when an investigation starts, the
Analyzer retrieves the data collected by the Proactive Analysis
from the secure storage.
6) Reactive Analysis: the Analyzer evaluates the satisfac-
tion of each hypothesis and sends the results to the Presentation
activity. The Analyzer uses the abductive reasoning function-
ality of the Event Calculus. For each hypothesis that can still
be satisfied, the Analyzer generates a set of potential events
that represent the missing evidence necessary to satisfy this
hypothesis. For example, when an investigation starts, we can
assume that the sequence of events retrieved from the Secure
Storage state that Bob was logged on M1 and accessed the
Doc while a USB was mounted. In this case, the Analyzer will
discover that only 6 of the original hypotheses are satisfiable
(the ones that state that Bob logged on M1).
7) Presentation: this activity shows the probability of
satisfaction of each hypothesis. The investigator selects the
hypotheses s/he wants to focus on and receives indications
regarding the remaining evidence to be collected. For example,
the investigator is suggested to collect additional evidence from
a CCTV to confirm that Bob is in T225 when he logged on
M1, and to verify whether Bob owns the USB pen.
8) Reactive Collection: the investigator retrieves the re-
maining evidence, by using, for example, existing commercial
tools, stores it securely and sends it to the Analyzer that
updates the satisfaction of the hypothesis. The cycle (5-8)
continues until the investigator identifies a set of hypotheses
that can be presented in court.
III. CONCLUSIONS
Although several research approaches have been proposed
to collect forensically sound evidence, only a few work use
formal techniques to tackle the automatic analysis of the
acquired evidence. Some existing approaches use finite state
machines [5], and event calculus [6] for events reconstruction.
However, none of them suggests how to automate and adapt
the whole digital investigation. One approach [7] integrates
proactive collection and analysis of digital evidence with
reactive digital forensics processes. However, it does not
provide detail on how a digital forensics process should be
configured. Furthermore, it does not specify how proactive
and reactive activities can be coordinated, for example, how
proactive digital evidence can be used during an investigation.
It is our belief that providing a requirements-driven approach
can facilitate a digital investigation and shorten the cycles for
the events reconstruction.
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